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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:  
This case involves a concerted effort by the 
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and various Pennsylvania 
counties to bar attorneys from the Capital Habeas Unit of the 
Federal Community Defender Organization for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania (“Federal Community Defender”) 
from representing clients in state post-conviction proceedings. 
In seven different Post-Conviction Review Act (“PCRA”) 
cases in various Pennsylvania counties, hearings were 
initiated to disqualify the Federal Community Defender as 
counsel. In each case, the cited reason for disqualification was 
based on the organization’s alleged misuse of federal grant 
funds to appear in state proceedings.  
 
The Federal Community Defender removed all of 
these motions under the federal officer removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). In response, the Commonwealth 
filed motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to return each case to 
the state court, claiming that the federal officer removal 
statute did not confer federal subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Federal Community Defender then filed motions to dismiss 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that 
the Commonwealth lacked a private right of action under 
federal law, and alternatively that federal law preempted the 
Commonwealth’s motions.  
 
 The District Courts split on the jurisdictional question. 
In three cases, the Eastern District of Pennyslvania denied the 
Commonwealth’s motions to remand and granted the Federal 
Community Defender’s motions to dismiss. In four cases, the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania granted the motions to 
remand, and denied as moot the Federal Community 
Defender’s motions to dismiss.  
 
 The threshold question before us is whether the 
Federal Community Defender Organization’s invocations of 
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removal jurisdiction were proper. We conclude that they 
were. On the merits of the Federal Community Defender’s 
motions to dismiss, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s 
attempts to disqualify it as counsel in PCRA proceedings are 
preempted by federal law. Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgments of the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and we reverse the judgments of the Middle 
District and remand with instructions to grant the Federal 
Community Defender’s motions to dismiss.1  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 A. Statutory Framework 
 
 The Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, 
requires each District Court to establish a plan to furnish 
representation to indigent persons charged with federal 
crimes. The CJA authorizes the Judicial Conference, the 
congressionally created policy-making arm of the U.S. 
Courts, to “issue rules and regulations governing the 
operation of plans [of representation] formulated under [the 
CJA].” § 3006A(h). The Judicial Conference has exercised 
this authority by promulgating a comprehensive regulatory 
framework for administering the CJA, which it sets out in its 
Guide to Judiciary Policy (“Guide”), Vol. 7, Part A.2  
 
                                              
1 Isaac Mitchell, the petitioner in the underlying post-
conviction proceeding that gave rise to Appeal No. 13-3817, 
died while the appeal was pending. Accordingly, we have 
dismissed that appeal as moot by separate order. 
2 Available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-
policies/judiciary-policies/criminal-justice-act-cja-guidelines 
(last visited May 27, 2015).  
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 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2), the District Court must 
appoint counsel to any indigent inmate, federal or state, 
pursuing a federal habeas corpus challenge to a death 
sentence. Further, habeas petitioners facing execution have 
“enhanced rights of representation” under 18 U.S.C. § 3599, 
as compared to non-capital defendants and other habeas 
petitioners. Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1284 (2012). 
This enhanced right of representation includes more 
experienced counsel, a higher pay rate, and more money for 
investigative and expert services. Id. at 1285. These measures 
“reflect a determination that quality legal representation is 
necessary in all capital proceedings to foster fundamental 
fairness in the imposition of the death penalty.” Id. 
(alterations and quotation marks omitted). In some 
circumstances, a federal court can appoint counsel to 
represent a federal habeas corpus petitioner in state court for 
the purpose of exhausting state remedies before pursuing 
federal habeas relief. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 190 n.7 
(2009). 
  
 For districts where at least two-hundred people require 
the appointment of counsel, the CJA allows for the creation of 
two types of defender organizations. The first is a Federal 
Public Defender, which is essentially a federal government 
agency. The second is a Community Defender Organization. 
See § 3006A(g)(2). A Community Defender Organization, 
while not a federal agency, is defined as a “nonprofit defense 
counsel service established and administered by any group 
authorized by the plan to provide representation.” 
§ 3006A(g)(2)(B). A Community Defender Organization’s 
bylaws must appear in “the plan of the district or districts in 
which it will serve,” and Congress requires it to “submit to 
the Judicial Conference of the United States an annual report 
setting forth its activities and financial position and the 
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anticipated caseload and expenses for the next fiscal year.” Id. 
 B. The Federal Community Defender Organization 
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts  
 
 The Federal Community Defender is a Community 
Defender Organization that represents indigent defendants 
charged with federal crimes. Its Capital Habeas Unit specially 
represents inmates sentenced to death in Pennsylvania in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings.   
 
 The Federal Community Defender operates as a 
distinct sub-unit of the Defender Assocation of Philadelphia. 
It receives a periodic sustaining grant through 
§ 3006A(g)(2)(B)(ii). This grant is paid “under the 
supervision of the Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts.” § 3006A(i). The Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts (“AO”) is an agency within the 
Judicial Conference. The Guide’s grant terms require the AO 
to audit the Federal Community Defender every year. Unless 
otherwise authorized by the AO, the Federal Community 
Defender is prohibited from commingling grant funds with 
non-grant funds and is required to use grant funds “solely for 
the purpose of providing representation and appropriate other 
services in accordance with the CJA.” J.A. 334; see also J.A. 
338-39. If the Federal Community Defender fails to “comply 
substantially” with the terms of the grant or is “unable to 
deliver the representation and other services which are the 
subject of th[e] agreement,” the Judicial Conference or the 
AO “may reduce, suspend, or terminate, or disallow payments 
under th[e] grant award as it deems appropriate.” J.A. at 341.  
 
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania designates the Federal Community Defender to 
facilitate CJA representation to eligible individuals. The 
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Middle District of Pennsylvania includes the Federal 
Community Defender as an organization that may be 
appointed to represent indigent capital habeas petitioners.3  
 
 The Federal Community Defender acknowledges that 
it sometimes appears in PCRA proceedings without a federal 
court order directing it to do so. It alleges, however, that in 
such cases it uses federal grant funds only for “preparatory 
work that [will also be] relevant to a federal habeas corpus 
petition” and only if it “has received a federal court order 
appointing it as counsel for federal habeas proceedings or is 
working to obtain such an appointment.” Second Step Br. 10. 
Otherwise, it uses donated funds. See id. at 10-11.  
 
C. The Genesis of the Disqualification Motions 
 
 These disqualification proceedings were spawned by a 
concurrence written by then-Chief Justice Castille of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a decision denying PCRA 
relief to a petitioner represented by the Federal Community 
Defender. Chief Justice Castille criticized the organization’s 
representation of capital inmates in state proceedings and 
asked pointedly: “is it appropriate, given principles of 
federalism, for the federal courts to finance abusive litigation 
in state courts that places such a burden on this Court?” 
Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 334 (Pa. 2011) 
(Castille, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Castille answered in 
the negative, commenting on the “obstructionist” tactics of 
the Federal Community Defender attorneys and the 
“perverse[ness]” of the commitment of federal resources to 
                                              
3 Middle District Plan, § VII, available at 
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/cja_plan.pdf 
(last visited May 27, 2015). 
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state post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 165.  
 D. Procedural History  
 
 Seizing on Chief Justice Castille’s comments, the 
District Attorney of Philadelphia filed a “Petition for Exercise 
of King’s Bench Jurisdiction Under 42 Pa. C.S. § 726” 
directly with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, requesting that 
all Federal Community Defender counsel be disqualified from 
continuing to represent clients in state PCRA proceedings 
absent an authorization order from a federal court. In re: 
Appearance of Federal FCDO in State Criminal Proceedings 
(hereinafter King’s Bench Petition), No. 11-cv-7531, Doc. 1 
at 11-42 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2011).  
 
 The Federal Community Defender removed the King’s 
Bench Petition to federal court in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennyslvania. Its basis for removal was 
the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), 
(d)(1). Within six days, however, the Commonwealth 
voluntarily dismissed the action.  
 
 The Commonwealth subsequently sought to disqualify 
Federal Community Defender counsel in individual PCRA 
proceedings. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also initiated 
inquiries into the Federal Community Defender’s continued 
representation of PCRA petitioners. Before us now are seven 
actions consolidated from the District Courts in the Eastern 
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and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.4 In each case, a federal 
                                              
4 The District Court judgments we review here are: In re 
Commonwealth’s Motion to Appoint Counsel Against or 
Directed to Defender Ass’n of Philadelphia, Respondent 
(hereinafter Dowling), 1:13-CV-510, 2013 WL 4458848 
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2013), reconsideration denied, 1:13-CV-
510, 2013 WL 5781732 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013); In re 
Proceedings Before the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe 
Cnty., Pa. to Determine Propriety of State Court 
Representation by Defender Ass’n of Philadelphia 
(hereinafter Sepulveda), 3:13-CV-511, 2013 WL 4459005 
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2013), reconsideration denied, 3:13-CV-
511, 2013 WL 5782383 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013); In re 
Commonwealth’s Request for Relief Against or Directed to 
Defender Ass’n of Philadelphia, Respondent (hereinafter 
Dick), 1:13-CV-561, 2013 WL 4458885 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 
2013), reconsideration denied, 1:13-CV-561, 2013 WL 
5781760 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013); In re: Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania’s Rule to Show Cause (hereinafter Housman), 
No. 13-cv-2103, Doc. 14 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013); In re 
Proceeding Before Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
(hereinafter Johnson), CIV.A. 13-2242, 2013 WL 4774499 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2013); In re Commonwealth’s Motion to 
Appoint New Counsel Against or Directed to Defender Ass’n 
of Philadelphia (hereinafter Harris), MISC.A. 13-62, 2013 
WL 4501056 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2013), reconsideration 
denied, MISC.A. 13-62, 2013 WL 5498152 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 
2013). The action mooted by Isaac Mitchell’s death is In re: 
Proceeding in Which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
Seeks to Compel the Defender Association of Philadelphia to 
Produce Testimony and Documents and to Bar it from 
Continuing to Represent Defendant Mitchell in State Court 
(hereinafter Mitchell), 13-CV-1871, 2013 WL 4193960 (E.D. 
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court assigned the Federal Community Defender to represent 
these clients in federal habeas corpus proceedings, but not in 
state PCRA proceedings. Like the King’s Bench Petition, the 
main thrust of these motions, as well as the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s orders, is that Federal Community Defender 
attorneys should be removed from the underlying PCRA 
cases because they are misusing federal funds by representing 
clients in state proceedings without an authorization order 
from a federal court. A summary of the allegations in these 
disqualification motions follows. 
 
 In Mitchell, the District Attorney of Philadelphia filed 
a “Motion to Remov[e] Federal Counsel” in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. J.A. at 309-16. The DA alleged that (1) “the 
presence of federally-funded [Federal Community Defender] 
lawyers in this case [wa]s unlawful [under 18 U.S.C. § 3599], 
as there has been no order from a federal court specifically 
authorizing them to appear in state court,” J.A. at 310, and (2) 
it was “a violation of the sovereignty of the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania for lawyers funded by a federal government 
agency for the purpose of appearing in federal courts to 
instead appear in the state’s criminal courts,” J.A. at 312-13.  
 
 In a per curiam order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
found that the Commonwealth’s allegations were potentially 
meritorious:  
[T]he matter is REMANDED to the PCRA 
court to determine whether current counsel, the 
. . . [Federal Community Defender] . . . may 
represent appellant [Mitchell] in this state 
capital PCRA proceeding, or whether other 
appropriate post-conviction counsel should be 
                                                                                                     
Pa. Aug. 15, 2013). 
13 
 
appointed. In this regard, the PCRA court must 
first determine whether the [Federal 
Community Defender] used any federal grant 
monies to support its activities in state court in 
this case. If the [Federal Community Defender] 
cannot demonstrate that its actions here were 
all privately financed, and convincingly attest 
that this will remain the case going forward, it is 
to be removed. 
 
J.A. at 275 (emphasis added).5  
 
 The Supreme Court’s remand order in Mitchell was the 
genesis of similar proceedings in the remaining PCRA cases 
that are on review here. In Housman, the District Attorney of 
Cumberland County filed an almost identical motion as the 
DA in Mitchell. J.A. at 713-20. The DA in Housman 
contended that, “[w]hen a PCRA court finds that [Federal 
Community Defender] attorneys use federal funding in a state 
proceeding, they must remove the [Federal Community 
Defender] attorneys from the case.” J.A. at 718. The Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania filed motions in three other cases, 
Harris, Dowling, and Dick. J.A. at 456, 502; In re: 
Commonwealth’s Request for Relief Against or Directed to 
Defender Association of Philadelphia, No. 13-cv-561, Doc. 
10-4 at 8 (M.D. Pa., March 28, 2013).  
 
                                              
5 This order provoked a dissent from two of the justices, on 
the basis that the legal issues “require the construction of 
federal statutes and other authority, consideration of the 
relationship between federal and state court systems in capital 




 In Johnson and Sepulveda, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court issued sua sponte orders to the PCRA trial courts. In 
Johnson, the Supreme Court required that the Federal 
Community Defender “produce a copy of any federal 
appointment order it may have secured in this matter, within 
ten (10) days of the issuance of this Order.” J.A. at 392. In 
Sepulveda, the order was more detailed:  
 
If federal funds were used to litigate the PCRA 
below—and the number of [Federal Community 
Defender] lawyers and witnesses involved, and the 
extent of the pleadings, suggest the undertaking was 
managed with federal funds—the participation of the 
[Federal Community Defender] in the case may well 
be unauthorized by federal court order or federal law. 
Accordingly, on remand, the PCRA court is directed to 
determine whether to formally appoint appropriate 
post-conviction counsel and to consider whether the 
[Federal Community Defender] may or should 
lawfully represent appellant in this state capital PCRA 
proceeding.  
 
Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1151 (Pa. 2012) 
(emphasis added).  
 
 The Federal Community Defender removed these 
seven proceedings, producing seven separate federal civil 
actions, four in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and three 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.6 The Commonwealth 
responded to each removal petition with a motion to remand, 
                                              
6 Although the disqualification proceedings were removed to 




claiming that federal jurisdiction was improper. The Federal 
Community Defender simultaneously filed a motion to 
dismiss on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). The District Courts split: judges in the Eastern 
District found there was federal jurisdiction and granted the 
Federal Community Defender’s motions to dismiss on the 
merits. A judge deciding four of these actions in the Middle 
District granted the Commonwealth’s motions to remand and 
denied as moot the Federal Community Defender’s motions 
to dismiss. Each party appeals the adverse rulings against it.   
 
II. REMOVAL JURISDICTION 
 
 The first issue in this case is whether federal courts 
have jurisdiction over the Commonwealth’s disqualification 
motions. We have jurisdiction over these appeals under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). We review de 
novo whether the District Court had subject matter 
jurisdiction. Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth, 
752 F.3d 316, 321 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014). A defendant seeking 
removal must provide a “notice of removal . . . containing a 
short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1446. This notice “must allege the underlying facts 
supporting each of the requirements for removal jurisdiction.” 
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Because the Commonwealth facially attacks jurisidiction, we 
construe the facts in the removal notice in the light most 
favorable to the Federal Community Defender. See 
Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
 
 The Federal Community Defender proposes that 
federal courts have mandatory jurisdiction under the federal 
officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), (d)(1). For 
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the following reasons, we agree.  
 
 A. Statutory Framework 
 
The federal officer removal statute has existed in some 
form since 1815. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 
(1969). The Statute’s “basic purpose” is:  
[T]o protect the Federal Government from the 
interference with its operations that would 
ensue were a State able, for example, to arrest 
and bring to trial in a State court for an alleged 
offense against the law of the State, officers and 
agents of the Federal Government acting within 
the scope of their authority. 
 
Watson v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007) 
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 The federal officer removal statute’s current form, § 
1442, is the result of many amendments that broadened a 
1948 codification of the statute. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406. 
Following its most recent amendment in 2011, the statute 
provides, in relevant part:  
 
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is 
commenced in a State court and that is against or 
directed to any of the following may be removed by 
them to the district court of the United States for the 
district and division embracing the place wherein it is 
pending: 
 
(1) The United States or any agency thereof or 
any officer (or any person acting under that 
officer) of the United States or of any agency 
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thereof, in an official or individual capacity, for 
or relating to any act under color of such office 
or on account of any right, title or authority 
claimed under any Act of Congress for the 
apprehension or punishment of criminals or the 
collection of the revenue. 
    . . .  
 
(d) In this section, the following definitions apply: 
 
(1) The terms “civil action” and “criminal 
prosecution” include any proceeding (whether 
or not ancillary to another proceeding) to the 
extent that in such proceeding a judicial order, 
including a subpoena for testimony or 
documents, is sought or issued. If removal is 
sought for a proceeding described in the 
previous sentence, and there is no other basis 
for removal, only that proceeding may be 
removed to the district court. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), (d)(1).   
 
 “Section 1442(a) is an exception to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, under which (absent diversity) a defendant 
may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s 
complaint establishes that the case arises under federal law.” 
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 644 n.12 
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this statute, 
a colorable federal defense is sufficient to confer federal 
jurisdiction. See id. Unlike the general removal statute, the 
federal officer removal statute is to be “broadly construed” in 
favor of a federal forum. See Sun Buick, Inc. v. Saab Cars 




 The Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-
51, 125 Stat. 545 (2011), made two amendments to § 1442 
that are relevant here. First, the Act clarified that the term 
“civil action” includes ancillary proceedings, so long as a 
“judicial order” is sought or issued. Id. at 545; see 
§ 1442(d)(1). Second, it added the words “or relating to” after 
“for” in § 1442(a). 125 Stat. 545. The House Committee on 
the Judiciary wrote that the changes to the statute were meant 
“to ensure that any individual drawn into a State legal 
proceeding based on that individual’s status as a Federal 
officer has the right to remove the proceeding to a U.S. 
district court for adjudication.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, pt. 1 
(2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420, 420. 
Furthermore, adding the “or relating to” language is “intended 
to broaden the universe of acts that enable Federal officers to 
remove to Federal court.” Id. at 425.   
   
 B. Preliminary Considerations 
 
 As a preliminary matter, we must address a couple of 
arguments raised by the Commonwealth. We note that the 
proceedings are “civil actions” as defined by § 1442(a)(1), 
(d)(1): they are ancillary proceedings in which a judicial order 
was sought or, in the cases of Mitchell, Johnson, and 
Sepulveda, issued. Contrary to the Commonwealth’s related 
assertion, attorney disciplinary proceedings are not 
categorically exempt from removal under § 1442. See 
Kolibash v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of W. V. Bar, 872 F.2d 
571, 576 (4th Cir. 1989) (allowing for attorney disciplinary 
proceedings in front of the Committee on Legal Ethics of 
West Virginia to be removed because the “state investigative 
body operate[d] in an adjudicatory manner”). In any event, 
the disqualification motions in this case are not attorney 
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disciplinary proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, No. 
576 CAP, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 2368, at *6 (Pa. Oct. 3, 2011) 
(Baer, J., dissenting) (contending that “unethical practices 
engaged in by the [Federal Community Defender] attorneys 
should be resolved by referral to the Disciplinary Board”). 
 
 C. Elements for Removal 
 
 In order for the Federal Community Defender to 
properly remove under § 1442, it must meet four 
requirements. The Federal Community Defender must show 
that (1) it is a “person” within the meaning of the statute; (2) 
the Commonwealth’s claims are based upon the Federal 
Community Defender’s conduct “acting under” the United 
States, its agencies, or its officers; (3) the Commonwealth’s 
claims against it are “for, or relating to” an act under color of 
federal office; and (4) it raises a colorable federal defense to 
the Commonwealth’s claims. Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 
1176, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 2012); accord Feidt v. Owens 
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 1998).  
 
 D. Application of the Elements for Removal  
 
 We address each of the four elements in turn.  
 
 1. The Federal Community Defender is a “person” 
 
 The Federal Community Defender is a “person” within 
the meaning of §1442(a)(1). Because the statute does not 
define “person,” we look to 1 U.S.C. § 1, which defines the 
term to “include corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1; see also Ruppel, 701 F.3d at 1181. 
As a non-profit corporation, the Defender Association of 
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Phildelphia falls within this definition. Furthermore, as the 
Second Circuit has recognized, “the legislative history is 
devoid of evidence suggesting that Congress intended § 1442 
not apply to corporate persons,” and “§ 1442 also lists other 
non-natural entities, such as the United States and its 
agencies, which suggests that interpreting ‘person’ to include 
corporations is consistent with the statutory scheme.” 
Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 135-36 (2d Cir. 
2008). Consequently, we find that the Defender 
Association—the umbrella organization and therefore the 
named party in this case—satisfies the first requirement for 
removal.  
 
 2.  The Federal Community Defender was “acting 
under” a federal officer or agency 
 
The Federal Community Defender satisfies the next 
element because the injuries the Commonwealth complains of 
are based on the Federal Community Defender’s conduct 
while it was “acting under” the AO. See Feidt, 153 F.3d at 
127.  
 
The words “acting under” describe “the triggering 
relationship between a private entity and a federal officer.” 
Watson, 551 U.S. at 149. The Supreme Court has stated that 
“the word ‘under’ must refer to what has been described as a 
relationship that involves ‘acting in a certain capacity, 
considered in relation to one holding a superior position or 
office.’” Id. at 151 (quoting 18 Oxford English Dictionary 
948 (2d ed. 1989)).  
 
Furthermore, “precedent and statutory purpose make 
clear that the private person’s ‘acting under’ must involve an 
effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the 
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federal superior.” Id. at 152. The Court has stressed that 
“[t]he words ‘acting under’ are broad, and . . . that the statute 
must be ‘liberally construed.’” Id. at 147 (quoting Colorado 
v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 517 (1932)).  
 
 While the Court has not precisely determined “whether 
and when particular circumstances may enable private 
contractors to invoke the statute,” id. at 154, it has noted with 
approval that “lower courts have held that Government 
contractors fall within the terms of the federal officer removal 
statute, at least when the relationship between the contractor 
and the Government is an unusually close one involving 
detailed regulation, monitoring, or supervision.” Id. at 153. 
The Supreme Court cited by way of example Winters v. 
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 398-400 (5th 
Cir. 1998), in which the Fifth Circuit determined that Dow 
Chemical was “acting under” color of federal office when it 
manufactured Agent Orange for use in helping to conduct a 
war pursuant to a contractual agreement with the United 
States.   
 
 The Watson Court explained that in Winters and other 
similar cases, the private contractor acted under a federal 
officer or agency because the contractors “help[ed] the 
Government to produce an item that it need[ed].” 551 U.S. at 
153. This is because, the “assistance that private contractors 
provide federal officers goes beyond simple compliance with 
the law and helps officers fulfill other basic governmental 
tasks.” Id. For example, in Winters, “Dow Chemical fulfilled 
the terms of a contractual agreement by providing the 
Government with a product that it used to help conduct a war. 
Moreover, at least arguably, Dow performed a job that, in the 
absence of a contract with a private firm, the Government 




 The Court contrasted government contractors with 
other private parties lacking a contractual relationship with 
the government. See id. It concluded that “compliance (or 
noncompliance) with federal laws, rules, and regulations does 
not by itself [bring a party] within the scope of the statutory 
phrase ‘acting under’ a federal ‘official.’” Id. at 153. The 
factual scenario in Watson itself is illustrative. In that case, 
Phillip Morris could not remove a deceptive and unfair 
business practices suit filed against it based merely on a 
defense that it complied with Federal Trade Commission 
regulations governing its advertising. Id. at 156. The Court 
explained that Congress could not have meant for the statute 
to sweep so broadly, for if mere compliance with federal law 
were sufficient, then the meaning of “acting under” could 
include taxpayers who complete federal tax forms; airline 
passengers who obey prohibitions on smoking; or federal 
prisoners who follow the rules and regulations governing 
their conduct. Id. at 152. These types of relationships do not 
warrant removal because state court prejudice would not be 
expected. See id.    
 
 We adopt the principles outlined in Watson to guide 
our understanding of whether the Federal Community 
Defender was “acting under” a federal agency. Cf. Jacks v. 
Meridian Res. Co., LLC, 701 F.3d 1224, 1231 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(relying on same); Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 
1086-87 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). The relationship between the 
Federal Community Defender and the federal government is a 
sufficiently close one to conclude that the Federal 
Community Defender was “acting under” a federal agency—
the Judicial Conference and its subordinate, the AO—at the 




 The Federal Community Defender is a non-profit 
entity created through the Criminal Justice Act that is 
delegated the authority to provide representation under the 
CJA and § 3599. Its “stated purposes must include 
implementation of the aims and purposes of the CJA.” Guide, 
Vol. 7A, Ch. 4, § 420.20(a). It also must adopt bylaws 
consistent with representation under the CJA and a model 
code of conduct similar to those governing Federal Public 
Defender Organizations. See § 420.20(a) & (c). Through this 
relationship, the Federal Community Defender “assists” and 
helps the AO to “carry out[] the duties or tasks of a federal 
superior,” which is to implement the CJA and § 3599 through 
the provision of counsel to federal defendants and indigent 
federal habeas corpus petitioners. See Watson, 551 U.S. at 
152. Unlike the companies in Watson, the Federal 
Community Defender provides a service the federal 
government would itself otherwise have to provide. See id. at 
154; Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137 (“Unlike the tobacco 
companies in Watson, Defendants received delegated 
authority; they were not simply regulated by federal law.”).  
 
 Additionally, the nature of the Commonwealth’s 
complaints pertains to the “triggering relationship” between 
the Federal Community Defender and the AO, because the 
Commonwealth targets the manner in which the Federal 
Community Defender uses its federal money, not another 
aspect of its representation of clients in state court. See 
Watson, 551 U.S. at 149. As a condition of receiving federal 
grant money, the Federal Community Defender must 
maintain detailed financial records, submit an annual report of 
activities and expected caseload, and return unexpended 
balances to the AO. Additionally, the Federal Community 
Defender is prohibited from commingling CJA funds with its 
other funds. And “[u]nless otherwise authorized by the AO, 
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no employee of a grantee organization (including the federal 
defender) may engage in the practice of law outside the scope 
of his or her official duties with the grantee.” J.A. at 340. The 
scope of when the Federal Community Defender acts under 
the AO, whatever its limits, surely extends to whether it 
sufficiently complies with its obligations under its grant, 
specifically whether it is engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law, or is commingling funds in violation of the AO’s 
directives. 
 
The Commonwealth disagrees, contending that the 
Federal Community Defender must show not only that it 
“act[ed] under” color of federal office at the time of the 
complained-of conduct, but also that the Federal Community 
Defender acted pursuant to a federal duty in engaging in the 
complained-of conduct. The Commonwealth argues that 
because the Federal Community Defender cannot state a duty 
to appear in PCRA proceedings on behalf of its clients, it 
cannot be “acting under” a federal agency when it does so. 
Framing the inquiry in this manner essentially collapses the 
“acting under” inquiry into the requirement that the 
complained-of conduct be “for, or relating to,” an act under 
color of federal office. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 124-25 (2d Cir. 
2007). Even if we were to address these requirements 
simultaneously, whatever causation inquiry we import could 
not be narrower than the one Congress has written into the 
statute. As discussed below, we disagree that the Federal 
Community Defender is required to allege that the 
complained-of conduct itself was at the behest of a federal 
agency. It is sufficient for the “acting under” inquiry that the 
allegations are directed at the relationship between the 




 Given these considerations, we conclude that the 
Federal Community Defender satisfies this requirement. 
 
 3. The Commonwealth’s claims concern acts “for 
or relating to” an act under color of federal office 
 
 We conclude that the Federal Community Defender 
satisfies the causation element because the Commonwealth’s 
claims concern acts “for or relating to” the Federal 
Community Defender’s federal office.  
 Prior to 2011, the proponent of jurisdiction was 
required to show that it has been sued “for any act under color 
of [federal] office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis 
added).7 In other words, the proponent was required to “show 
a nexus, a causal connection between the charged conduct 
and asserted official authority.” Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 
U.S. 423, 431 (1999) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
 For example, in Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 
36 (1926), the Supreme Court decided that four prohibition 
agents and their chauffeur could not take advantage of the 
federal officer removal statute for their state prosecutions for 
lying under oath to a coroner. According to the agents, what 
required them to testify in front of the coroner was their 
discovery of a man who was wounded, and who eventually 
died, on their way back from investigating an illegal alcohol 
still. Thus, they claimed that their federal duties were a cause 
of their allegedly perjurous testimony. Id. at 41. The Court 
                                              
7 Both before and after the 2011 amendments, however, the 
statute also permitted the removal of actions brought “on 
account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act 
of Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals 
or the collection of the revenue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).   
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determined that this connection was insufficient to justify 
removal because testifying before the coroner was not part of 
the agents’ official duties, and those were the acts that the 
State relied on for prosecution. Id. at 42. The Court 
acknowledged, however, that the acts need not be “expressly 
authorized” by a federal statute, so long as the acts 
complained of are “an inevitable outgrowth of” and “closely 
interrelated” with the officer’s federal duty. Id. 
 
 By contrast, the Court found a sufficient causal 
connection for removal jurisdiction in Acker, 527 U.S. 423. 
There, two federal district court judges resisted payment of a 
county’s occupational tax,8 claiming that it violated the 
“intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.” Id. at 429. After 
the State brought a collection action against the judges in 
state small claims court, the judges removed under § 1442 
and asserted that the small claims suits were “for a[n] act 
under color of office.” Id. at 432. The judges argued that there 
was a sufficient causal relationship because the ordinance at 
issue made it unlawful to engage in their federal occupation 
without paying the tax. Id. For its part, the State argued that 
the tax was levied against the judges personally, and not on 
them as judges, so the collection suit was unrelated to their 
federal office. Id. The Court decided that “[t]o choose 
between those readings of the Ordinance is to decide the 
merits of this case,” which it would not do at this stage. Id.; 
see also id. at 431 (“We . . . do not require the officer 
virtually to win his case before he can have it removed.”) 
(quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that the 
                                              
8 Defined as “[a]n excise tax imposed for the privilege of 
carrying on a business, trade, or profession.” TAX, Black’s 




judges had made an adequate threshold showing at this stage 
to grant federal courts jurisdiction under § 1442 because 
“[t]he circumstances that gave rise to the tax liability, not just 
the taxpayers’ refusal to pay, ‘constitute the basis’ for the tax 
collection lawsuits at issue.” Id. at 433. The tax suits arose 
out of the judges’ “holding court in the county and receiving 
income for that activity” and therefore had a sufficient nexus 
to the judges’ official duties. Id. 
 
 Thus, before 2011, proponents of removal jurisdiction 
under § 1442 were required to “demonstrate that the acts for 
which they [we]re being sued” occurred at least in part 
“because of what they were asked to do by the Government.” 
Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137. In 2011, however, the statute was 
amended to encompass suits “for or relating to any act under 
color of [federal] office.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2011) 
(emphasis added). Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal 
appellate court has addressed the significance of the insertion 
of the words “or relating to” in the statute. However, the 
Supreme Court has defined the same words in the context of 
another statute: “The ordinary meaning of the[] words 
[‘relating to’] is a broad one—‘to stand in some relation; to 
have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into 
association with or connection with.’” Morales v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)); see also Shaw 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 & n.16 (1983) 
(same). Thus, we find that it is sufficient for there to be a 
“connection” or “association” between the act in question and 
the federal office. Our understanding comports with the 
legislative history of the amendment to § 1442(a)(1), which 
shows that the addition of the words “or relating to” was 
intended to “broaden the universe of acts that enable Federal 
officers to remove to Federal court.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-17, 
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pt. 1 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420, 425.  
 
 In this case, the acts complained of undoubtedly 
“relate to” acts taken under color of federal office. First, the 
Federal Community Defender attorneys’ employment with 
the Federal Community Defender is the very basis of the 
Commonwealth’s decision to wage these disqualification 
proceedings against them. The Commonwealth has filed these 
motions to litigate whether the Federal Community Defender 
is violating the federal authority granted to it. As the Supreme 
Court has noted, whether a federal officer defendant has 
completely stepped outside of the boundaries of its office is 
for a federal court, not a state court, to answer. See Acker, 527 
U.S. at 431-32; Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409 (“If the question 
raised is whether they were engaged in some kind of ‘frolic of 
their own’ in relation to respondent, then they should have the 
opportunity to present their version of the facts to a federal, 
not a state, court.”). 
 
 Moreover, the Federal Community Defender’s 
representation of state prisoners in PCRA proceedings is 
closely related to its duty to provide effective federal habeas 
representation. As the Supreme Court has emphasized on 
numerous occasions, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 significantly increased the extent to 
which federal habeas relief is contingent on the preservation 
and effective litigation of claims of error in state court, 
including state post-conviction proceedings: 
 
Under the exhaustion requirement, a habeas 
petitioner challenging a state conviction must 
first attempt to present his claim in state court. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). If the state court rejects 
the claim on procedural grounds, the claim is 
29 
 
barred in federal court unless one of the 
exceptions to the doctrine of Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82-84, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 
L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), applies. And if the state 
court denies the claim on the merits, the claim is 
barred in federal court unless one of the 
exceptions to § 2254(d) set out in §§ 2254(d)(1) 
and (2) applies. Section 2254(d) thus 
complements the exhaustion requirement and 
the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that 
state proceedings are the central process, not 
just a preliminary step for a later federal habeas 
proceeding, see id., at 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497. 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). As a result, 
counsel in PCRA proceedings must be careful to comply with 
state procedural rules, file within applicable limitations 
periods, and fully exhaust their clients’ claims in order to 
secure meaningful habeas review in federal court. The impact 
PCRA litigation can have on a subsequent federal habeas 
petition is, of course, one of the reasons the Federal 
Community Defender represents prisoners in such litigation. 
This impact is significant enough to convince us that the 
Federal Community Defender’s actions in PCRA litigation 
“relate to” its federal duties for purposes of removal 
jurisdiction.  
 
 4. The Federal Community Defender raises 
colorable defenses 
 
 The final element for removal requires the Federal 
Community Defender to raise a “colorable federal defense” to 
the Commonwealth’s claims. Acker, 527 U.S. at 431-32. 
Since at least 1880, the Supreme Court has required that 
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federal officer removal be allowed if, and only if, “it appears 
that a Federal question or a claim to a Federal right is raised 
in the case, and must be decided therein.” Mesa v. California, 
489 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 
100 U.S. 257, 262 (1880)) (quotation marks and emphasis 
omitted). This requirement assures that federal courts have 
Article III jurisdiction over federal officer removal cases. 
Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136.9  
 The Commonwealth contends that the federal defense 
must coincide with an asserted federal duty. Not so. In Acker, 
for example, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
defendant-judges’ defense—that they enjoyed 
“intergovernmental tax immunity”—brought them within the 
removal statute, notwithstanding the fact that the judges’ 
duties did not require them to resist the tax. See 527 U.S. at 
437. What matters is that a defense raises a federal question, 
not that a federal duty forms the defense. True, many removal 
cases involve defenses based on a federal duty to act, or the 
lack of such a duty. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 126-34. But the 
fact that duty-based defenses are the most common defenses 
does not make them the only permissible ones.   
                                              
9 We note that, in this case, because the motions for 
disqualification have as an element a nested federal question 
that is both “disputed” and “substantial,” Article III “arising 
under” jurisdiction likely exists even without the assertion of 
a federal defense. Cf. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. 
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); Mesa, 489 
U.S. at 129 (describing a federal officer removal case where 
the plaintiff “could have brought suit in federal court based 
on ‘arising under’ jurisdiction” because the plaintiff claimed 






  The Federal Community Defender raises three 
colorable defenses. First, the Federal Community Defender 
claims that it was not violating the terms of § 3599 when it 
appeared in state court because it used non-federal funds 
when necessary. Second, it argues that the Commonwealth’s 
attempts to disqualify it on the alleged basis that it was 
misusing federal grant money is preempted by federal law. 
Third, it argues that the Commonwealth lacks a cause of 
action to enforce the terms of the Federal Community 
Defender’s grant with the AO under the CJA, § 3599, or 
otherwise. Each of these three defenses is analogous to a 
defense the Supreme Court has allowed to trigger 
removability.   
 
 The Federal Community Defender’s first defense is a 
“colorable federal defense” akin to the one raised in 
Cleveland, C., C. & I.R. Co. v. McClung, 119 U.S. 454 
(1886). In McClung, a railroad company sued a U.S. Customs 
collector, McClung, in state court for recovery of a lien. The 
company alleged that McClung had a duty under federal law 
to notify the railroad company before delivering merchandise 
to the consignees, even where the consignees had paid the 
lien over to the collector. Id. at 454-56. McClung argued that 
he had no duty to notify the railroad company under federal 
law, which allowed him to remove. Id. at 462. In a later case 
interpreting McClung, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]o 
assert that a federal statute does not impose certain 
obligations whose alleged existence forms the basis of a civil 
suit is to rely on the statute in just the same way as asserting 
that the statute does impose other obligations that may shield 
the federal officer against civil suits.” Mesa, 489 U.S. at 130. 
In both cases, the defenses “are equally defensive and equally 




 The defense raised by the Federal Community 
Defender is analogous to the defense raised in McClung. The 
Commonwealth claims that the Federal Community Defender 
has violated 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and the grant terms in its 
contract with the AO, which implements the statute. The 
Federal Community Defender responds that it has violated 
neither set of requirements. Whether this is true is a 
determination to be made by a federal court. We find this to 
be a federal defense in that it requires interpretation of federal 
statutes, the CJA and § 3599, as well as the Guide, which the 
Judicial Conference promulgated to effectuate these statutes.   
 
 Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, this 
defense is not foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the boundaries of § 3599. See Harbison, 556 
U.S. at 180. Harbison examined whether state clemency 
proceedings were proceedings “subsequent” to federal habeas 
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e). If they were, § 3599(e) 
would require the district court to appoint an attorney, already 
appointed for purposes of seeking federal habeas relief, to 
represent the petitioner in those proceedings as well. The 
Court determined that state clemency proceedings were 
“subsequent” and that appointment of counsel was 
authorized. Id. at 182-83. The Court contrasted state 
clemency with state post-conviction relief, stating that “[s]tate 
habeas is not a stage ‘subsequent’ to federal habeas. Just the 
opposite: Petitioners must exhaust their claims in state court 
before seeking federal habeas relief. See § 2254(b)(1).” 
Harbison, 556 U.S. at 189. Thus, absent an authorization 
order from a federal district court requiring exhaustion of 
state remedies, federally funded counsel would not be 
required in such situations. Id. at 190 n.7. The Court never 
stated, however, that Federal Community Defender counsel 
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would be prohibited from representing clients in state habeas 
proceedings in preparation for federal habeas corpus 
representation. See id. Indeed, that is the question squarely 
presented by the merits of this case. Because we must accept 
the Federal Community Defender’s theory of the case at this 
juncture, see Acker, 527 U.S. at 432, we find this defense to 
be colorable. 
 
 Next, the Federal Community Defender claims that the 
Commonwealth is impermissibly attempting to interfere in 
the relationship between the Federal Community Defender 
and the AO under the preemption principles laid out in 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-
48 (2001). This federal defense is similar to the one raised by 
the judges in Acker, which was that Jefferson County’s tax 
“risk[ed] interfering with the operation of the federal 
judiciary in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity 
doctrine.” 527 U.S. at 431 (alterations in original and 
quotation marks omitted). This, too, is a “colorable” defense 
that the Federal Community Defender can raise in federal 
court: it is plausible that the Congress intended for no one 
other than the Judicial Conference and the AO to monitor and 
enforce a Community Defender Organization’s compliance 
with its grant terms.  
 
 Finally, the Federal Community Defender raises the 
defense that the Commonwealth lacks a private right of action 
to enforce § 3599 and the terms of the Federal Community 
Defender’s grant with the AO. Similar to the preemption 
defense, the lack of a right of action in the Commonwealth is 
premised on the idea that Congress has delegated authority 
only to the Judicial Conference and the AO to monitor and 
enforce the CJA and § 3599. Thus, the Commonwealth’s 
attempt to enforce these statutory provisions would interfere 
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with Congress’s intended mechanism for gaining compliance 
with the CJA and § 3599.   
 
The Federal Community Defender therefore satisfies 
all of the requirements of § 1442(a)(1), and the 
disqualification proceedings were properly removed.10 
III. THE MERITS OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNITY 
DEFENDER’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
 Satisfied that we have proper jurisdiction over these 
consolidated appeals under the federal officer removal statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), we now turn to the merits of the Federal 
Community Defender’s motions to dismiss under Rule 
                                              
10 In its Third Step Brief, the Commonwealth argues for the 
first time that, even if the federal courts have jurisdiction over 
these proceedings, we should decline to exercise it under the 
Younger abstention doctrine. Because the Commonwealth 
failed to raise this issue in its First Step Brief, it has waived 
the argument. Winston v. Children & Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 
1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, we decline to 
exercise our discretion to look past the waiver because the 
abstention argument lacks merit. The Commonwealth has 
pointed us to no courts that have exercised Younger 
abstention where the federal officer removal statute grants 
jurisdiction. In fact, the courts we are aware of, that have 
addressed the argument, have found such an exercise of 
abstention to be inappropriate. See, e.g., Jamison v. Wiley, 14 
F.3d 222, 239 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he removal jurisdiction 
granted by § 1442(a), which is designed to protect federal 
employees against local prejudice, is mandatory, not 
discretionary, and a district court has no authority to abstain 
from the exercise of that jurisdiction on any ground other than 
the two specified in 1447(c).”). 
35 
 
12(b)(6). To summarize, the Federal Community Defender’s 
motions argue, in relevant part, that the Commonwealth lacks 
a private right of action to enforce the CJA and § 3599, and, 
alternatively, that the disqualification motions are preempted 
by federal law.  
 
 As for the right of action argument, the 
Commonwealth concedes that it lacks a right of action under 
the CJA or § 3599. And without a private right of action, the 
Commonwealth may not claim a direct violation of federal 
law. See Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 296-97 (3d 
Cir. 2007); see also State of N.J., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. & 
Energy v. Long Island Power Auth., 30 F.3d 403, 421 n.34 
(3d Cir. 1994) (noting that a State also needs a right of action 
to enforce a federal law).  
 
 Rather, the Commonwealth argues that its 
disqualification motions rest on state law. The named source 
of state authority is Article V, § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania 
constitution, which allows the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
to “prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and 
the conduct of all courts.” Accordingly, we look to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Orders issued for the substance 
of the rule in this case. Those Orders provide that if the 
Federal Community Defender fails to show that its actions 
representing its clients are entirely “privately financed” with 
non-federal funds, the state PCRA court is to disqualify the 
Federal Community Defender as counsel. J.A. at 275 
(Remand Order in Mitchell); see also Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 
1151 (sua sponte Order); J.A. at 392 (sua sponte Order in 
Johnson).  
 
 It is unclear whether these Orders were in fact issued 
pursuant to Article V, § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania 
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constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court undoubtedly 
has the power to enforce its rules of conduct. But the Orders 
here are concerned with the unauthorized use of federal funds 
and cite no generally applicable rule governing the practice of 
law in Pennsylvania courts. Whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court relied on its § 10(c) authority is a question of 
state law, and if that Court were to speak on the question, we 
would be bound by its determination. We may sidestep this 
issue, however, as the Federal Community Defender prevails 
regardless of the answer. As explained above, the 
disqualification proceedings may not enforce the federal 
statutes at issue here. If, on the other hand, the 
disqualification proceedings are based on state law, they 
conflict with federal law and are therefore preempted.  
 
 The doctrine of conflict preemption “embraces two 
distinct situations.” MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 495 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 905 (2014). The first is “where it is impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and federal law.” 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 
(2000). This type of conflict preemption is not present here, 
because it would be possible for the Federal Community 
Defender to comply with both federal law and the state rule 
alleged by the Commonwealth by withdrawing as counsel in 
these cases. The second type of conflict preemption arises 
“where under the circumstances of a particular case, the 
challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.” Id. at 373 (alterations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). This is the type of conflict 
preemption that the Federal Community Defender presses.  
 
 The Supreme Court has instructed that, “particularly in 
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those [cases] in which Congress has legislated . . . in a field 
which the States have traditionally occupied, . . . [courts] start 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth 
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Fellner v. Tri-Union 
Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that, “because the States are independent 
sovereigns . . . we have long presumed that Congress does not 
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action” (citation 
omitted)). This presumption does not apply, however, when 
Congress legislates in an area of uniquely federal concern. 
See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347.  
 
 The presumption against preemption does not apply 
here. As a general matter, it is true that the States have a long 
history of regulating the conduct of lawyers, who are officers 
of the courts. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
361-62 (1977). But the impetus for the proceedings here is 
that the Federal Community Defender is allegedly applying 
its federal grant funds to purposes not authorized by the 
relevant federal statutes and grant terms. See, e.g., Sepulveda, 
55 A.3d at 1151; J.A. at 275. As explained above, these 
grants are paid under the supervision of the AO, a federal 
agency within the Judicial Conference with regulatory control 
over the Federal Community Defender. “[T]he relationship 
between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is 
inherently federal in character because the relationship 
originates from, is governed by, and terminates according to 
federal law.” Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347. Policing such 
relationships “is hardly a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied,” and thus there can be no presumption 





 In light of this determination, we find that the 
disqualification proceedings are preempted. The overarching 
purpose of the federal statutory provisions at issue here is to 
provide “quality legal representation . . . in all capital 
proceedings to foster fundamental fairness in the imposition 
of the death penalty.” Martel, 132 S. Ct. at 1285 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). To achieve this objective, Congress 
has authorized grants to Community Defender Organizations 
and tasked the AO with supervising grant payments. The 
disqualification proceedings, however, seek to supplant the 
AO by allowing the Commonwealth’s courts to determine 
whether a Community Defender Organization has complied 
with the terms of its federal grants and to attach consequences 
to noncompliance. 
 
 Significantly, the disqualification proceedings are 
preempted whether or not federal law authorizes the Federal 
Community Defender to use grant funds for certain purposes 
in PCRA cases. If the Federal Community Defender is 
authorized to use grant funds, the Commonwealth plainly 
cannot disqualify it for doing so without undermining 
congressional objectives. But even if the Federal Community 
Defender is not authorized to use grant funds, the 
disqualification proceedings interfere with the regulatory 
scheme that Congress has created.  
 
 As the Supreme Court has observed, “‘[c]onflict is 
imminent whenever two separate remedies are brought to 
bear on the same activity.’” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012) (quoting Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., 
Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 
(1986)). “Sanctions are drawn not only to bar what they 
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prohibit but to allow what they permit, and the inconsistency 
of sanctions [may] undermine[] the congressional calibration 
of force.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380 (2000). This is especially 
so when a federal agency is afforded the discretion to apply 
those sanctions or stay its hand. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 
349-51; Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 123 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(noting that “regulatory situations in which an agency is 
required to strike a balance between competing statutory 
objectives lend themselves to a finding of conflict 
preemption”). 
 
 Here, Congress has delegated supervisory authority 
over CJA grants to the AO. The AO has the power to “reduce, 
suspend, or terminate, or disallow payments . . . as it deems 
appropriate” if the Federal Community Defender does not 
comply with the terms of its grants. J.A. at 341. But if the 
Commonwealth could sanction noncompliance, the AO could 
be hindered in its ability to craft an appropriate response. For 
example, the AO might be inhibited from exercising its 
authority to reduce payments if it knew that the 
Commonwealth might disqualify the Federal Community 
Defender from representing indigent capital defendants as a 
result. After all, as the District Court noted in Mitchell, “the 
[AO’s] usual remedies, such as recoupment of distributed 
funds, are more consistent with the CJA’s objectives because 
they mitigate the disruption to the existing attorney-client 
relationships.” 2013 WL 4193960, at *19. Allowing the 
Commonwealth to attach consequences to the Federal 
Community Defender’s relationship with the AO would 
“exert an extraneous pull on the scheme established by 
Congress” in a manner that conflicts with federal objectives. 
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353. 
 
 Consequently, we hold that the disqualification 
40 
 
proceedings brought against the Federal Community 




 The federal officer removal statute provides removal 
jurisdiction for federal courts to decide the motions to 
disqualify filed in the Commonwealth’s PCRA proceedings. 
Those disqualification proceedings are preempted by federal 
law. We will therefore affirm the judgments of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and reverse the Middle District’s 
judgments, remanding to the Middle District with instructions 
that the Federal Community Defender’s motions to dismiss be 
granted.11  
                                              
11 We also wish to express our agreement with the sentiments 
expressed in the concurrence, which further discusses the 
context of this dispute. 
1 
McKEE, Chief Judge, concurring 
I agree with the Majority’s conclusions that this action 
was properly removed under the federal officer removal 
statute, 28 U.S.C. §§1442(a)(1), (d)(1) (2012), and that any 
state law cause of action is preempted.  I therefore join the 
Majority Opinion in its entirety.  Nevertheless, I feel 
compelled to write separately to amplify the context of this 
dispute and to stress that the Commonwealth is not actually 
proceeding on a state law theory at all, despite its claims to 
the contrary.   
   I.  Context 
 
Although it does not alter our legal analysis of the 
issues before us, it is difficult not to wonder why the 
Commonwealth is attempting to bar concededly qualified 
defense attorneys from representing condemned indigent 
petitioners in state court.  A victory by the Commonwealth in 
this suit would not resolve the legal claims of these capital 
habeas petitioners.  Rather, it would merely mean that various 
cash-strapped communities would have to shoulder the cost 
of paying private defense counsel to represent these same 
petitioners, or that local pro bono attorneys would have to 
take on an additional burden.  And it would surely further 
delay the ultimate resolution of the petitioners’ underlying 
claims.  
 
Pennsylvania law instructs that, after the conclusion of 
a death-sentenced prisoner’s direct appeal, “the trial judge 
shall appoint new counsel for the purpose of post-conviction 
collateral review, unless . . . [among other things] the 
defendant has engaged counsel who has entered, or will 
promptly enter, an appearance for the collateral review 
proceedings.”  Pa. R. Crim. P. 904(H)(1)(c).  Death-sentenced 
petitioners are thus entitled to counsel during PCRA 
proceedings, and they may be represented by their counsel of 
choice.  Id.  In the cases consolidated for this appeal, the 
Federal Community Defender asserts that its attorneys, 
members of the Pennsylvania bar, are functioning in that 
capacity—counsel of choice for their condemned clients.  The 
Commonwealth does not challenge that representation.  
 
2 
As my colleagues in the Majority note, the genesis of 
these disqualification motions was a concurring opinion by 
then-Chief Justice Castille in Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 
A.3d 244 (Pa. 2011) (Castille, C.J., concurring).1  Maj. Op. 7-
8.  The opinion severely criticized the tactics, motives, 
integrity, and even the veracity of Federal Community 
Defender attorneys who had intervened in state court PCRA 
proceedings on behalf of a condemned prisoner.  It is rife 
with harsh critiques of the Federal Community Defender. See 
Spotz, 18 A.3d at 334 (Castille, C.J., concurring) (“There is 
no legitimate, ethical, good faith basis for [their] obstreperous 
briefing.”).2  Chief Justice Castille lamented in his concurring 
opinion in Spotz that the Federal Community Defender’s 
“commitment of . . . manpower” in the PCRA proceedings 
was “something one would expect in major litigation 
involving large law firms.”  Spotz, 18 A.3d at 332 (Castille, 
C.J., concurring).  However, I am not quite sure why the same 
kind of meticulous devotion of resources should not be 
available to someone who has been condemned to die by the 
                                              
1 Then-Chief Justice Castille was joined by then-
Justice McAfferty and joined in part by then-Justice Melvin. 
Although each of these jurists has since left the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, I refer to them as “Chief Justice” or “Justice” 
for the sake of simplicity.  
 
2 The opinion further described the representation as 
abusive and inappropriate.  See Spotz, 165 A.3d at 330 
(Castille, C.J., concurring) (“[I]it is time to take more 
seriously requests by the Commonwealth to order removal of 
the Defender in cases where, as is becoming distressingly 
frequent, their lawyers act inappropriately.”); id. (“[I]t is not 
clear that the courts of this Commonwealth are obliged to 
suffer continued abuses by federal ‘volunteer’ counsel paid 
by the federal courts.”); id. at 333 (“The Defender’s briefing 
in this Court is similarly abusive.”); id. at 335 (noting that, 
although the presence of the Federal Community Defender 
“spares Pennsylvania taxpayers the direct expense of state-
appointed counsel[,] . . . that veneer ignores the reality of the 
time lost and the expenses generated in the face of the 
resources and litigation agenda of the Defender”); id. at 336 
(referring to “the morass that is the Defender’s brief”).  
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state and who seeks to challenge the legality of that 
punishment.  State post-conviction proceedings are a critical 
stage of litigation for those challenging their capital murder 
convictions or death sentences.  Surely, these cases are not 
less important than the “high dollar” litigation to which large 
law firms so often devote substantial resources.3   
 
The ultimate fate of a habeas petitioner in federal court 
depends to a very large extent on the performance of counsel 
in state post-conviction proceedings.  Indeed, as appreciated 
by my colleagues, “state proceedings are the central process, 
not just a preliminary step for a later federal habeas 
proceeding.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).  
The state post-conviction stage is often a habeas petitioner’s 
first opportunity to raise claims that certain constitutional 
rights have been violated, and many such claims require 
significant investigation.  See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 
1309, 1317 (2012) (noting that, in that case, “the initial-
review collateral proceeding [was] the first designated 
proceeding for a prisoner to raise a [Sixth Amendment] claim 
of ineffective assistance at trial”); Commonwealth v. Grant, 
813 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the practice of 
most state and federal courts is to “only review those claims 
on direct appeal that can be adequately reviewed on the 
existing record[,]” and deciding that ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are properly presented in state collateral 
proceedings).  With very limited exceptions, a petitioner must 
raise all claims during state post-conviction proceedings or 
forfeit review of those claims in federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(1) (2012); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 
(2004).  Any federal review is almost always limited to the 
results of the investigations that occurred during state post-
conviction proceedings.   
 
Moreover, as any experienced practitioner appreciates, 
it is exceedingly difficult to introduce additional evidence in 
support of these claims in federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 
                                              
3 In making this point, I do not mean to minimize the heinous 
nature of the crimes which many of the Defender’s clients 
were convicted of. However, that is simply not the point, nor 
can it be relevant to the clients’ entitlement to counsel under 
our system of justice.   
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2254(e)(2).  Thus, after a state court has ruled on the merits of 
a condemned petitioner’s post-conviction claim, “the die is 
cast”—as that ruling will only be disturbed during federal 
habeas corpus review if the state court’s judgment “was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law.”  Id. § 2254(d)(1).  “[A]n 
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 410 (2000).  Thus, even if a federal court has a firm 
belief that the state court’s ruling on a petitioner’s federal 
claim was incorrect, the federal court usually must defer to 
the state ruling.  See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (“A state 
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 
federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” 
(citation omitted)).  It is readily apparent to the lawyers who 
litigate and the judges who decide these cases that procedural 
and substantive mistakes of state post-conviction counsel can 
destroy the chances of vindicating even meritorious 
constitutional claims in federal court.  
 
Conversely, a thoroughly investigated and well-
presented petition for post-conviction relief in state PCRA 
proceedings can ensure that petitioners’ claims are fully heard 
and appropriately decided on the merits, rather than going 
unresolved in federal court because of earlier procedural 
defects. In addition to the important investigative and 
substantive legal work that an attorney must undertake during 
post-conviction proceedings in state court, attorneys must 
fastidiously comply with state procedural rules and the one-
year statute of limitations contained in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)—which can 
be notoriously difficult to calculate—or risk being barred in 
federal court on procedural grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991) (“The 
[independent and adequate state ground] doctrine applies to 
bar federal habeas when a state court declined to address a 
prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had failed to 
meet a state procedural requirement.”); see also Pace v. 
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 n.6 (2005) (discussing 
5 
different means of calculating AEDPA’s one-year limitations 
period).4   
The labyrinthine complexity of federal habeas review 
has caused one noted jurist to conclude that AEDPA’s 
“thicket of procedural brambles” is one of the most difficult 
legal schemes for an attorney to navigate.  In re Davis, 565 
F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).  
Indeed, AEDPA’s procedural obstacle course compares to the 
notoriously vexing Rule Against Perpetuities insofar as both 
enmesh the unwary (or unseasoned) lawyer in a procedural 
minefield that can put him or her out of court.5  Even if a 
petitioner’s claims are eventually heard in federal court, 
initial missteps can increase the expense and time of the 
litigation there.  See, e.g., Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 916–17 
(noting that the issue of whether a petitioner could excuse his 
procedural default, caused by negligent attorneys’ missing a 
state court filing deadline, had been litigated extensively 
                                              
4 “In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his 
federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and 
adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the 
claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for 
the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 
violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to 
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage 
of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. A procedural default 
caused by state post-conviction counsel’s mistake may also 
be excused if agency relationship between the lawyer and 
client had been severed, see Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 
912 (2012), or (in more limited circumstances) if the state 
post-conviction counsel was unconstitutionally inadequate, 
see Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012). 
However, relief on the basis of inadequate state post-
conviction counsel remains difficult to obtain. See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010) (“Surmounting 
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”). 
 
5 See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial 
and Statutory Correctives, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322  
(1960) (“[T]he esoteric learning of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is, apart from dim memories from student days, a 
monopoly of lawyers who deal in trusts and estates.”). 
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below).  Deciding issues of life and death on such procedural 
intricacies threatens to undermine trust and confidence in the 
accuracy of the criminal justice system.  See Brendan Lowe, 
Will Georgia Kill an Innocent Man?, TIME, July 13, 2007, 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,1643384,00.html (explaining that the requirements of 
AEDPA made it difficult for petitioner Troy Davis to litigate 
his claim of actual innocence).  
Systematic attempts to disqualify competent Federal 
Community Defender attorneys from representing clients in 
state post-conviction proceedings are all the more perplexing 
and regrettable when one considers the plethora of literature 
discussing how inadequate representation at the state post-
conviction stage increases the cost of the criminal justice 
system and creates a very real risk of miscarriages of justice.  
See Ken Armstrong, Lethal Mix: Lawyers’ Mistakes, 
Unforgiving Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2014, at A1.  For 
example, many petitioners have been barred from federal 
court because their lawyer missed a deadline.  See id.  There 
are numerous reasons why this should concern prosecutors as 
much as defense counsel—not the least of which is that some 
actually innocent petitioners only gain relief at the federal 
habeas corpus stage of their post-conviction appeals process.  
See id. (noting, by way of example, that “of the 12 
condemned prisoners who have left death row in Texas after 
being exonerated since 1987, five of them were spared in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings”).6  There were at least 
125 exonerations in 2014—the highest in recorded history.  
See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 
2014 at 1 (2015), available at https://www.law. 
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2
014_report.pdf.  Access to the Great Writ can be particularly 
                                              
6 See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) 
(“[W]hile [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at 
liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.”). 
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critical to death-sentenced petitioners, some of whom may 
have meritorious claims of actual innocence.7  
Against this backdrop, the Federal Community 
Defender has apparently concluded that representing these 
petitioners at an earlier stage of their post-conviction appeals 
process is consistent with its purpose, and the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts has neither voiced an 
objection, nor chosen to interfere with this representation.  
Rather, the Commonwealth (i.e., opposing counsel) is 
attempting to disqualify highly qualified defense counsel 
from representing these death-sentenced petitioners in state 
court.  The Commonwealth is obviously not objecting 
because the Federal Community Defender is providing 
inadequate representation and thereby denying the petitioners 
the constitutional rights that all parties seek to respect.  
Rather, the objection seems to be that the Federal Community 
Defender is providing too much defense to the accused.  To 
again quote the criticism from the Spotz concurrence, they are 
approaching the litigation the same way a large law firm 
might approach representation of a client in “major litigation” 
concerning large sums of money.  See Spotz, 18 A.3d at 332 
(Castille, C.J., concurring).  
 
II.  The Authority for the Disqualification Motions 
 
The Majority Opinion notes that it is “unclear” 
whether the Orders in this case were actually issued pursuant 
to the “named source of state authority,” Article V, § 10(c) of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution.  Maj. Op. 31.  It is not only 
                                              
7 This is not to suggest that state courts are less capable of 
ruling on constitutional claims, or that lawyers other than the 
Federal Community Defender are less capable of litigating 
them.  However, it would be naïve to think that the 
investigation, presentation, and preservation of these claims is 
a simple task, or that the skill with which the claims are 
presented to state and federal courts has no effect on how the 
courts resolve those claims.  The petitioners in these cases 
understand the stakes of this litigation, and they have chosen 
the Defender as their counsel of choice.  Given that context 
and the lack of sanctionable misbehavior by the Federal 
Community Defender, I merely urge that we respect that 
decision. 
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unclear, it is quite dubious.  I separately address this issue to 
highlight the absence of authority to support the 
Commonwealth’s argument and to emphasize the extent to 
which the legal underpinnings of the Commonwealth’s 
argument have shifted during this litigation.  The 
Commonwealth’s current theory appears to be that state law 
authorizes promulgation of new disqualification rules targeted 
at specific Pennsylvania attorneys in specific cases.  Although 
both the weakness of that position as well as the extent to 
which the Commonwealth has previously relied on a different 
theory are worth emphasizing, I nevertheless agree with the 
Majority’s conclusion that the Commonwealth’s claims are 
preempted, even if they were properly based in state law.   
 A.  The Commonwealth’s legal rationales 
 
The Commonwealth did not initially rely on the 
Pennsylvania Constitution in seeking disqualification of the 
Federal Community Defender attorneys.  Rather, the 
Commonwealth claimed it was seeking to disqualify the 
Federal Community Defender from appearing in state court 
because of an alleged misuse of federal funds.  The district 
court in Mitchell, one of the cases that was consolidated for 
this appeal, accurately described the Commonwealth’s 
litigation theory as follows: 
 
The Commonwealth’s seven-page motion 
devoted almost two pages of citations to its 
allegation that the presence of federally-funded 
[Federal Community Defender] lawyers in 
Mitchell’s state case was unlawful under federal 
law. Mot. for Removal ¶ 6. It asserted no 
corollary state law cause of action, and it made 
no reference to an attorney disqualification 
proceeding or to any violation of the rules of 
professional conduct. The motion offered a 
single state law citation: it pled jurisdictional 
authority to pursue the matter under Section 
10(c) of the state Constitution, the general 
provision endowing the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court with the right to govern its courts. Id. ¶ 7. 
Even this citation, however, was secondary to 
its assertion, earlier in the paragraph, that it had 
9 
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce federal law. 
Id. 
 
In re Pennsylvania, No. 13-1871, 2013 WL 4193960, 
at *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2013) (footnote omitted) 
[hereinafter Mitchell].  As the Mitchell court noted, § 
10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was only used to 
justify opposition to the Federal Community 
Defender’s representation of capital defendants after 
the Federal Community Defender removed this action 
to federal court.  However, even then, § 10 was more 
of a passing reference than the foundation of the 
Commonwealth’s arguments in the district courts. 
 
Article V, § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
allows the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to make “general 
rules” to govern the state court system.  PA. CONST., art. V § 
10(c).  However, §10(c) is not cited at all in the 
Commonwealth’s briefs to this Court.  Instead, the 
Commonwealth stated generally that the disqualification 
motions were rooted in the “sovereign authority of 
Pennsylvania, including its power to supervise the practice of 
law under Article V, § 10 of the State constitution.”  Com. 
First Step Br. 38.  It later cited to Article V, § 10(a) of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution as the basis for the state’s 
sovereign power to “regulate[] the practice of law in 
Pennsylvania State courts.”  Com. Third Step Br. 37; see also 
id. at 34.  
 
By contrast, the basis for the Commonwealth’s 
challenge to the Federal Community Defender at the 
beginning of this litigation was federal law.  The rules 
articulated by the state Supreme Court in these consolidated 
cases differed slightly in their wording, but the main thrust of 
each was as follows:  
 
If federal funds were used to litigate the PCRA 
[proceeding] . . . the participation of the 
[Federal Community Defender] in the case may 
well be unauthorized by federal court order or 
federal law. Accordingly, on remand, the PCRA 
court is directed to determine whether to 
formally appoint appropriate post-conviction 
10 
counsel and to consider whether the [Federal 
Community Defender] may or should lawfully 
represent appellant in this state capital PCRA 
proceeding. 
 
Maj. Op. 11 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 
1108, 1151 (Pa. 2012)).  Not only was federal law the initial 
basis for these Orders, it was the only justification given in 
state court for disqualifying the Federal Community 
Defender.  Thus, far from proceeding on a state law theory, 
the Commonwealth originally claimed that its opposition to 
the Federal Community Defender’s representation was based 
on the Commonwealth’s desire to enforce federal law.  
 
 The Commonwealth concedes that it lacks a right of 
action under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A et. 
seq, and I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the 
Commonwealth may therefore not “claim a direct violation of 
federal law.”  Maj. Op. 31.  Because the Commonwealth has 
no right of action to enforce federal law directly, it also does 
not have the authority to enforce compliance with federal law 
indirectly through a new state rule targeted at specific 
attorneys.  See Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 
131 S. Ct. 1342, 1345 (2011) (noting that direct and indirect 
legal challenges are “one and the same” and must be treated 
as such, “[n]o matter the clothing in which [litigants] dress 
their claims” (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  The post hoc nature of 
the Commonwealth’s assertion that the rules aimed at the 
Federal Community Defender were actually made pursuant to 
§ 10(c), and the absence of supporting authority for this 
theory, seriously undermine the credibility of that assertion.   
  
B. State law cause of action 
 
As my colleagues appreciate, and as I explained at the 
outset, the impetus for this litigation, and ultimately this new 
“rule,” was the concurring opinion in Spotz that accused the 
Federal Community Defender in the PCRA litigation of being 
“abusive,” “obstructionist,” and “contemptuous.”  18 A.3d at 
330–33 (Castille, C.J., concurring).  It also referred to the 
alleged use of federal funds for that purpose as “perverse.” Id. 
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at 331.8  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then promulgated 
what amounts to a new “rule” in cases where the Federal 
Community Defender was representing a PCRA petitioner: 
that the lower courts should consider disqualifying counsel if 
they conclude that the Federal Community Defender is 
misusing federal funds.  See, e.g., Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 
1151.  However, because this rule bears no resemblance to 
the procedural rules that the state Supreme Court has 
historically promulgated or enforced pursuant to § 10(c), the 
proposition that § 10(c) actually provides authority for the 
disqualification rule is tenuous at best. 
                                              
8 The Commonwealth cites to the Spotz line of reasoning in 
its brief to this Court, arguing that the Federal Community 
Defender has “pursued a strategy to overwhelm the state 
courts with volumes of claims and pleadings, many simply 
frivolous, a strategy which burdens prosecutors and can shut 
down a trial court for weeks.” Com. First Step Br. 48 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The criticism leveled at the Federal 
Community Defender in Spotz, and repeated by the 
Commonwealth in its briefing, goes beyond accusations of 
zealousness or merely over-trying a case. The Chief Justice 
and the concurring Justices accuse the Federal Community 
Defender of engaging in tactics that are intended to obstruct 
the state’s judicial process and thereby halt the state’s attempt 
to enforce the death penalty. See Spotz, 18 A.3d at 331 
(Castille, C.J., concurring). Later, in response to a motion 
asking him to withdraw that concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Castille issued a Single Justice Opinion on Post-Decisional 
Motions, which reaffirmed the importance of “principled 
representation of indigent capital defendants” as being 
“lawyering in the best tradition of the bar.” Commonwealth v 
Spotz, 99 A.3d 866, 867 (2014) (Castille, C.J.). However, the 
opinion again described representation of the Federal 
Community Defender as advancing “an agenda beyond mere 
zealous representation, one which routinely pushes, and in 
frequent instances, as here, far exceeds ethical boundaries” in 
pursuit of its “global agenda.” Id. at 867. The opinion then 
sets forth examples to support its accusation that the Federal 
Community Defenders “are at bottom gaming a system and 
erecting roadblocks in aid of a singular goal—keeping 




The Pennsylvania Constitution states, in relevant part, 
that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe 
general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct 
of all courts . . . if such rules are consistent with this 
Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant. . . .”  PA. CONST., art. V § 
10(c).  Though § 10 gives the state Supreme Court authority 
to “exercise general supervisory . . . authority” over the courts 
and to prescribe “general rules” regulating the courts, nothing 
about the rules announced in these cases is the least bit 
“general.”  PA. CONST., art. V § 10(a), (c).  Instead, as my 
colleagues note, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decreed 
that “if the Federal Community Defender fails to show that its 
actions representing its clients are entirely ‘privately 
financed’ with non-federal funds, the state PCRA court is to 
disqualify the Federal Community Defender as counsel.”  
Maj. Op. 31.  Rather than being a general rule, the Order that 
energizes this dispute is aimed squarely and solely at the 
Federal Community Defender.  
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has exercised its § 
10 power in a number of different ways, but it has not 
previously promulgated a targeted rule like the one that is 
purportedly present here. Moreover, its previous exercises of 
§ 10 authority are so dissimilar from this case that they 
provide little support for the Commonwealth’s current theory.  
For example, the Court has promulgated and enforced general 
rules of civil and appellate procedure.9  It has exercised its § 
10(c) power to regulate judges, attorneys, and the practice of 
law by creating and enforcing the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which regulates the activity of judges,10 and by defining and 
                                              
9 See Commonwealth v. Rose, 82 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2013); 
Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 436 A.2d 147, 
155 (Pa. 1981) (referring to the state Supreme Court’s 
“constitutional rule-making authority”). 
 




regulating the practice of law in Pennsylvania.11  It has also 
maintained its exclusive authority over the regulation of 
attorneys in the state by invalidating legislation that attempted 
to regulate this area.12  In a more unique use of this power, the 
state court established procedures to implement a new 
constitutional rule announced by the United States Supreme 
Court.13  Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition 
that the state court, ethics board, or other appropriate entity 
can make and enforce clearly-established, generally 
applicable rules of conduct to govern the conduct of judges 
and lawyers in state courts. 
 
 In re Merlo, the main case cited by the 
Commonwealth in support of its actions here, is an illustrative 
example of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s § 10 power.  
17 A.3d 869 (2011).  Though the Commonwealth asserts that 
Merlo supports its claim, the run-of-the-mill attorney 
discipline case is so dissimilar from the instant case that it 
actually undercuts the Commonwealth’s positon.  In Merlo, a 
local judge who had been suspended for absenteeism and for 
being abusive towards parties petitioned to set aside her 
suspension on the ground that the Supreme Court did not 
have the power to suspend her.  Id. at 871.  The state Supreme 
Court had suspended the judge after concluding that the 
Judicial Conduct Board had probable cause to file a formal 
charge against her.  That charge asserted various violations of 
the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of Magisterial 
District Judges.  In its decision, Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
explained that an earlier amendment to the state constitution 
                                              
11 See Lenau v. Co-eXprise, Inc., 102 A.3d 423, 432–33 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2014). 
 
12 See Wajert v. State Ethics Comm’n, 420 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 
1980). 
 
13 See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 99 A.3d 11, 26 (Pa. 2014) 
(interpreting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which 
held that intellectually disabled people could not be executed, 
but which initially gave states the ability to establish 
procedures to assess whether capital defendants were 
intellectual disabled).  
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had not stripped it of its general and broad power to supervise 
attorneys and enforce the state ethics rules.  Id.  
 
Merlo thus demonstrates how the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court regulates attorney discipline: by applying 
general rules of conduct equally to all lawyers.  The 
additional cases cited by the Commonwealth also generally 
support the position that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
retained the power to regulate the conduct of lawyers through 
enforcement of the state’s ethical and conduct rules.  See 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jepsen, 787 A.2d 420, 424–
25 (Pa. 2002) (holding that the Court of Judicial Discipline 
does not have exclusive authority over regulating lawyers’ 
conduct).14  It is clear that Pennsylvania courts and the state 
                                              
14 The cases relied on by the Commonwealth also explain that 
courts themselves, not merely the state disciplinary board, 
have the power to enforce the state ethical rules against 
lawyers who appear before them. Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 338 
A.2d 584, 587 (1975) (explaining that a judge may disqualify 
an attorney appearing before him who is conflicted out of 
representing his client); Am. Dredging Co. v. City of Phila., 
389 A.2d 568, 571–72 (1978) (noting that a trial court has the 
power and duty to ensure that lawyers appearing before it 
comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility, and 
considering the merits of whether an attorney betrayed the 
confidence of a client). Finally, the authority cited by the 
Commonwealth makes clear that a state’s ability to regulate 
lawyers is undoubtedly one of its important roles—though 
that power is not without limits. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 
U.S. 438, 442–43 (1979) (holding that out-of-state attorneys 
did not have a federal constitutional right to appear pro hac 
vice in Ohio court); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
97 S. Ct. 2691, 2694 (1977) (holding that a state rule barring 
lawyers from advertising their services was not challengeable 
under the Sherman Act but also that the state rule, as applied, 
violated the attorneys’ First Amendment free speech rights). 
The Commonwealth also referred to Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 
U.S. 558 (1984), and Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 
(1975), which involved challenges under the Sherman Act to 
the grading of the Arizona bar exam and a fee schedule 
published by a Virginia county bar, respectively. Neither 
supports the Commonwealth’s argument that its state 
15 
disciplinary board have the authority to discipline any 
attorney whose conduct so transcends the bounds of propriety 
as to be sanctionable.  However, none of the generally 
applicable rules that regulate the conduct of Pennsylvania 
lawyers were even cited in the disqualification orders before 
us.15  To the extent that the Federal Community Defender’s 
zealousness violates generally-applicable codes of conduct, 
the appropriate remedy would appear to be enforcing those 
codes of conduct in specific instances against specific 
attorneys rather than systematically depriving condemned 
prisoners of their counsel of choice as a matter of policy.  
The issue here is not whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court can enforce Pennsylvania’s ethical rules; it 
surely can, but the Disqualification Orders in these cases were 
not issued pursuant to a charge that the Federal Community 
Defender violated a specific rule of conduct.  Rather, the 
question here is what rule or law is actually being enforced.  
The Federal Community Defender argues that the 
Commonwealth is impermissibly trying to enforce federal 
law.  The Commonwealth now relies upon a state law cause 
of action.  However, the Commonwealth has not directed us 
to a previous instance where § 10 has been used to support 
what it attempts in this case: enforcement of a specific rule 
that is aimed directly at a single legal office or attorney based 
on conduct which has not been found to violate any of 
                                                                                                     
constitution is a proper basis of authority for the 
disqualification motions in to this case.  
 
15 The Commonwealth argued at a hearing in the district court 
in the Mitchell litigation that Pennsylvania Rule of 
Professional Conduct 8.3(a) was the true basis of the 
disqualification motion.  That rule “instructs attorneys to 
inform ‘the appropriate professional authority’ if he or she 
‘knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness 
as a lawyer.’”  Mitchell, 2013 WL 4193960, at *14 (citing 
204 Pa. Code § 8.3(a)).  This is the only mention of an 
existing Rule of Professional Conduct of which I am aware. 
The Commonwealth appears to have abandoned this 
argument on appeal.  
16 
Pennsylvania’s general rules governing the conduct of 
lawyers.  The absence of any such citation is understandable, 
as I have not been able to find any such case. Therefore, even 
if it were not preempted, the purported disqualification rule 
here would not be authorized under state law.16   
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 Though this dispute has been cloaked in claims of state 
authority and appeals to principles of federalism, I am 
unfortunately forced to conclude that this suit actually arises 
out of simple animosity or a difference in opinion regarding 
how capital cases should be litigated.  Given the costs of 
capital litigation and the very real stakes for the petitioners in 
these cases, it is extremely regrettable that this debate has 
now played out in our judicial forum. 
                                              
16 Like my colleagues, I recognize that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the 
state constitution.  However, neither the Majority Opinion nor 
this opinion relies on an interpretation of state law. Moreover, 
as explained, federal law preempts any state law cause of 
action. 
